New research presented by Prof. Jan Krämer at the Digital Economics Conference 2026

Prof. Jan Krämer (Chair of Internet & Telecommunications Business, University of Passau) participated in the 18th Digital Economics Conference hosted by the Toulouse School of Economics. The conference is one of Europe’s leading academic events in digital economics, bringing together researchers working on platform markets, data governance, competition policy, and innovation in digital industries. It provides a forum for cutting-edge theoretical and empirical research at the intersection of economics, technology, and regulation.

Two research papers co-authored by Prof. Krämer were presented at the conference.

Are Preset Defaults Harmful?

Authors: Jan Krämer (University of Passau), Hemant K. Bhargava (University of California), Chayanin Wipusanwan (University of Passau)

This paper examines the controversial practice of preset defaults in digital markets — for example, when devices or browsers come with a pre-selected search engine. Such defaults have been heavily scrutinized by regulators and courts, who often argue that they entrench dominant firms.

Using a theoretical model, the authors show that the effects of preset defaults are more nuanced than commonly assumed. Defaults influence competition through two distinct channels: switching frictions that make users less likely to change the preset option, and behavioral effects among users who passively accept defaults. Interestingly, these mechanisms can soften competition in ways that do not always harm consumers.

A key finding is that the impact of defaults depends strongly on network effects. For products with strong network effects, defaults may actually increase consumer welfare by strengthening firms’ incentives to innovate. In contrast, for products with weaker network effects, defaults are more likely to reduce competition without generating comparable innovation benefits. The study highlights that blanket bans on preset defaults may therefore be misguided, especially when the default product is of higher quality.

Machine Data Sharing and Innovation Incentives

Authors: Flavio Pino and Carlo Cambini (Politecnico di Torino), Jan Krämer (University of Passau)

This paper studies how mandatory access to machine-generated data — as foreseen under recent European regulation — affects innovation and market outcomes. The authors analyze a setting in which a manufacturer sells a connected product and may also offer a data-analytics service, while third parties can enter with their own analytics solutions.

The results show that manufacturers often have no strong incentive to block data access, even without regulation. However, the regulation of royalties under a “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” framework has complex effects. In some market constellations, higher royalties can actually stimulate third-party innovation by affecting pricing incentives upstream.

Whether data-sharing rules improve welfare depends crucially on the relationship between services. If third-party services are complements, strict regulation may reduce welfare. If they are substitutes, regulation can enhance consumer surplus. The paper thus suggests that data-access and royalty rules should be carefully tailored to specific market structures rather than applied uniformly.

Prof. Krämer’s participation highlights the Chair’s ongoing contribution to international debates on platform regulation, data governance, and innovation policy in digital markets.